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Terrorism

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introduced more nationalistic elements into education and moved toward closer government control of the economy; as Foreign Minister he was in office at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the rape of Nanking. His trial was hardly a model. Hirota's lawyer, an American Quaker, was effectively banned from the trial by a choleric Australian judge. The court refused to admit any evidence from Ambassador Joseph Grew's diary; Grew had written that he could think of no one he "would have more gladly chosen to head the government with American interests in view" than Hirota. The death verdict was by a 6-5 vote. The American chief prosecutor called the sentence stupid. The Allied Council for Japan (General MacArthur as SCAP tried to avoid involvement in the trial) refused a recommendation from the court for commutation of Hirota's death sentence. Finally, SCAP refused to publish the dissenting justices' opinions; the Netherlands judge had written a telling one which has since been published.

This book seems deliberately low-keyed. Only three of the eleven chapters deal with the trial and little is made of the dignified stoicism displayed by Hirota throughout the trial and imprisonment. As far as the reviewer can infer, this reflects the tone of the original Japanese text.

How then to account for the sale of a half a million copies—large even in a highly literate society such as Japan? Are the Japanese about to take a longer look at the Tokyo trials? Will this look be taken in a mood of resurgent nationalism? In a mood of incipient anti-Americanism? The book suggests a negative answer to all three questions, but the sales figures make one wonder.

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Liston, Robert A. *Terrorism.* Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 1977. 158pp.

Robert A. Liston is a seasoned free-lance writer who has decided to tackle the question of terrorism. Liston is concerned—indeed "outraged" to use his own words—about terrorism and terrorists, and the product of his outrage against this "crime against humanity" is anything but a dispassionate book. *Terrorism* is a diatribe against terrorism by states, by revolutionaries, and by criminals.

The difficulty with books like this is that they really tell us very little about the problem of terrorism, beyond the "fact" that it is almost always unnecessary when viewed from the perspective of the author. Liston does not understand why such groups as the Fedayeen (here we avoid the more inclusive term "Palestinians" that Liston favors), the Basques and the South Moluccan terrorists cannot peacefully settle their claims through negotiation, majority rule (?), and local autonomy. Were it only so simple. Liston likes the world as it is, how inconvenient that others do not share his view.

The attentive newspaper reader is likely to find little new in this short book. Perhaps the most useful chapter is a nice anecdotal overview of actions that are being taken to combat terrorism. Most disturbing are Liston's prescriptions for defeating terrorism. These include the curtailment of publicity surrounding acts of terrorism, which raises important First Amendment questions in the United States, and worse, Liston's assertion that we "must surrender a portion of our liberty and convenience to achieve greater protection." This latter development would play right into the hands of terrorist groups (e.g., the Red Brigade) who seek precisely such a curtailment of freedoms as a means to foster resentment against the ruling government.

Before terrorism can be eliminated from this world—if such a goal is even

plausible—we must first understand the primary causes. For example, what makes a man or a woman reject nonviolent means and eschew conventional morality, and turn to terrorism? Such questions must be answered; perhaps Liston will calm down a bit and try to do so in a second book on terrorism.

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Louis, William Roger. *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 594pp.

Perhaps the most enduring legacy bequeathed to posterity by the Second World War was the opportunity for nonwhite colonial peoples to secure their independence. In this impressively researched and solidly documented volume, Professor Louis provides a detailed account and a substantive analysis of the thinking, planning, considerations, negotiations, and circumstances that preceded the dismemberment of the British Empire. As the title indicates, the focus is on U.S.-British relations and the future of British possessions and mandates, although related questions of holdings by other nations, both allies and enemies, are dealt with in the overall context.

Trouble over these issues began with the joint statement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of 14 August 1941, the highly publicized Atlantic Charter, which affirmed "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," and expressed the "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." The provisions of this Charter were included in the U.N. Declaration of 1 January 1942, signed by 26 nations, and on 23 February 1942 President Roosevelt stated that the principle of self-determination was applicable "to the whole world." Yet on 9 September 1941 Churchill told the House of Commons that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to "India, Burma, and other parts of the British Empire," and on 10 November 1942 he asserted, "We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." These diametrically opposed positions taken by the leaders of the Western Allies did not disrupt the joint effort in prosecuting the war against the Axis Powers but they did provide a divisive issue in war aims and postwar settlements and created dissension in branches of the two governments. By untangling and explaining the diverse approaches taken by planners in the United States and Great Britain, the exchanges between representatives of both nations, and the eventual agreement, Louis makes his greatest contribution.

In Washington, the State Department under Secretary Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles worked to implement the ideas of Roosevelt in regard to trusteeship, i.e., the international supervision of colonies with accountability to the United Nations, self-government, and the objective of independence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments strove to carry out the President's concern for security in the Pacific, which required U.S. control of islands for bases and fortifications. Thus the State Department and the military were each pursuing ends that simply were not compatible.

In London a similar but not identical situation prevailed. The Foreign Office was more inclined to a compromise with the American position, while the Colonial Office was adamantly opposed to any tampering with the Empire or Commonwealth system. Australia and New Zealand were additional thorns in